Sample Deliverable · 72-Hour Quantum Threat Assessment
Banco Ejemplo
Migration evidence file.
This is what a completed assessment looks like, produced against an invented mid-size Latin American bank so that the format can be shown without a client's data in it. The institution, the twelve assets, and every number below are fabricated for that purpose. The method, the scoring, the advisory cross-reference and the evidence file format are the real ones.
Scope and method
Ingested from an architecture document and a spreadsheet
Mosca inequality exceeded by the widest margins
Reported as safe, because reporting only findings is not an inventory
The near edge of the published survey band, chosen deliberately
Every asset is scored with the Mosca inequality. X is how long the data must stay confidential, Y is how long migrating that surface takes, and Z is the Q-Day planning horizon. When X plus Y exceeds Z, the exposure is already live, because anything harvested today is still valuable when the capability arrives. Z is set to 10years here, the near edge of the band the Global Risk Institute's 2025 expert survey publishes. That is a planning choice and the deliverable says so: move Z and the whole ranking moves with it, which is exactly the sensitivity a board should be shown rather than shielded from.
Cryptographic inventory, ranked by exposure
X plus Y against Z.
| Asset | Primitive | X | Y | X+Y | IR 8547 | Tier | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A-01 | Customer PII archive Retention is set by consumer protection law, not by the bank. Nothing on this inventory has a longer shelf life. | RSA-2048 at rest, TLS 1.2 in transit | 30 | 4 | 34 | Category 1 | CRITICAL |
| A-12 | Backup encryption Symmetric. The known quantum speedup is quadratic, so a 256 bit key retains a large margin. Listed to show what a clean finding looks like. | AES-256-GCM | 30 | 1 | 31 | Category 4 | SAFE |
| A-03 | Mortgage contract store Signature validity must outlive the loan. A 25 year instrument signed today is signed with a primitive on a deprecation clock. | RSA-2048 signatures | 25 | 4 | 29 | Category 1 | CRITICAL |
| A-02 | Internal PKI root Everything else on this list chains to it, so its migration time is the longest and must start first. | RSA-4096, 15 year validity | 15 | 5 | 20 | Category 1 | CRITICAL |
| A-04 | Treasury settlement archive P-256 discrete log is the first curve most public roadmaps put at risk. | ECDSA P-256 | 12 | 3 | 15 | Category 1 | CRITICAL |
| A-05 | KYC and AML document store Regulatory retention sets X. It is not negotiable downward. | RSA-2048 envelope encryption | 10 | 3 | 13 | Category 1 | CRITICAL |
| A-06 | Cross-border payment gateway Sits just inside the horizon. Ranked high because the counterparty controls half the migration schedule. | RSA-2048 key exchange | 7 | 2 | 9 | Category 2 | HIGH |
| A-07 | Card issuance HSM keys Y is large because the hardware refresh cycle, not the cryptography, sets the pace. | RSA-2048, EMV key hierarchy | 5 | 4 | 9 | Category 2 | HIGH |
| A-08 | Code signing chain Fast to migrate, long lived in effect: signed artifacts stay in the field after the key is retired. | RSA-3072 | 8 | 1 | 9 | Category 2 | HIGH |
| A-11 | Core banking service mesh Internal traffic, short shelf life, but Y grows with every service added. | mTLS, ECDHE P-256 | 3 | 3 | 6 | Category 2 | MONITOR |
| A-09 | Internet banking front end Session confidentiality expires quickly. Low harvest value, high visibility. | TLS 1.2, ECDHE P-256 | 2 | 2 | 4 | Category 2 | MONITOR |
| A-10 | Mobile certificate pinning Bounded by app release cadence. | ECDSA P-256 pins | 2 | 1 | 3 | Category 3 | MONITOR |
X and Y in years. A row where X plus Y exceeds 10 is exposed on this horizon. A-12 is included precisely because it is clean: an inventory that reports only problems is a sales document, not an inventory.
Executive brief
What the board is told.
Five of twelve inventoried surfaces are exposed on a 10year horizon, and the exposure is driven by data retention rather than by any weakness in the current deployment. The bank's cryptography is correctly configured today. The problem is that customer records, mortgage instruments and know-your-customer files must stay confidential for longer than the primitives protecting them are expected to hold, so material copied now retains its value until well past the point where it can be read. The internal certificate authority is the pacing item: everything else chains to it, and its migration is the longest single task on the plan, so it starts first regardless of its own ranking. Nothing here calls for an emergency response. It calls for a dated programme, begun this quarter, with each step recorded as it happens so the position can be shown to a supervisor without reconstructing it after the fact.
Technical roadmap
Sequenced by dependency, not by severity.
Migrate the internal PKI root (A-02) to ML-DSA and stand up dual signing on the code signing chain (A-08). These have the longest effective reach and the fewest external dependencies, so they set the pace for everything downstream. Nothing else can complete before the root does.
Re-encrypt the customer PII archive (A-01), the KYC store (A-05) and the mortgage contract store (A-03) under ML-KEM hybrid envelopes. These carry the largest X values on the inventory, which means anything harvested today stays valuable for decades. Re-encryption runs in place, oldest records first, because the oldest records are the ones most likely to have been collected already.
Open hybrid key exchange negotiation with the cross-border payment gateway counterparties (A-06) and schedule the card HSM refresh (A-07) against the existing hardware cycle. Both depend on a third party agreeing to a date, so the work in this phase is as much scheduling as engineering, and it starts early for that reason.
Move the TLS front end (A-09), mobile pins (A-10) and service mesh (A-11) as their normal release cycles come round, since their short shelf life means the deadline rather than the threat drives them. Throughout, every migration step emits a signed evidence record, so the state of the programme can be shown to a supervisor at any point without reconstructing it afterwards.
Advisory cross-reference
Which rule reaches which asset.
When a supervisor asks which framework requires a given remediation, the answer is already in the file rather than assembled in response to the question.
Classical key establishment deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035.
Software and firmware signing moves first in the published sequence.
Inventory obligations attach to the PKI layer before the application layer.
The ICT risk framework must document the exposure and the remediation schedule, not merely the intent.
Long lived signatures need a migration path that survives the signing key.
The evidence file
The part that is not a document.
You can check it without us.
A real engagement ships this analysis together with a signed evidence file: a hash chained record of how each finding was produced, sealed so that any later edit to a number, a tier or a date fails verification and names the check that broke. Verifying it needs no account with us, no network call, and no code of ours beyond a single published file.
The findings above are invented, so no receipt is issued for them. The format is not invented, and you do not have to take that on trust either. Download the verifier and the published receipt, run one against the other, then change a single character in the receipt and run it again.
The receipt published here is a demonstration receipt: its payload is a sample rather than a real engagement. The output below is what verifying it actually prints. We say which is which rather than letting a demonstration stand in for finished work.
python verify_counterfoil.py receipt.json integrity PASS hash chain recomputes and closes on its anchor claim PASS presented claim hashes to the sealed payload authenticity PASS Ed25519 seal verifies over the terminal record identity PASS key fingerprint be19cba981ce0e02 valid: true
That was the invented bank.
Yours takes 72 hours.
Same method, same scoring, same evidence file, with your inventory in place of this one. Scope and terms are agreed before anything is ingested.